Detective Fiction in the Archives: Court Records and the Uses of Law in Late Medieval England by McSheffrey, Shannon
  
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article 
accepted for publication in History Workshop Journal following 
peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version  
“Detective Fiction in the Archives: Court Records and the Uses of 
Law in Late Medieval England,” History Workshop Journal 65 
(Spring 2008), 65-78, is available online at: 




Detective Fiction in the Archives: Court Records and the Uses of 
Law in Late Medieval England 
Shannon McSheffrey 
 
Historians are often compared to detectives, searching for clues and 
uncovering connections until at last the truth is found and the mystery is 
solved.1 The fictional detective works the streets and the historian works the 
archives, but the process of building a case and of making logical inferences 
from scattered clues is sometimes remarkably similar. Historians, however, are 
no longer permitted the certainty that marked the conclusions of classic 
detective fiction: we are rarely, if ever, sure anymore about who dunnit 
(whatever „it‟ might be) or why. This constant epistemic doubt can be 
                                           
I am grateful for the help and advice on this article offered by Kit French, Evan May, Elena 
Razlogova, Eric Reiter, Ron Rudin, and the reviewers for this journal. 
Note: Spelling in quotations in Middle English are modernized, with the original in the footnote 
when appropriate; modernizations and translations from Latin sources are my own.  
1 See, for instance, Robin Winks, ed., The Historian as Detective, New York, 1969. 
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disorienting. On the one hand, many archival detectives, myself included, 
have, like our progenitor Jules Michelet, an essentially romantic sense that we 
can virtually see the dead through the dust of the document. The piece of 
parchment or paper, in some cases actually held by the hand of the person 
whom we are investigating, seems to create a literally tangible connection.2 On 
the other hand, both theory and the practical problems of research warn us 
continually that this vision of the dead is a mirage, or at least a highly 
refracted image: each new clue can throw all previous evidence into 
completely new light, effectively changing the direction of the narrative 
running inside our heads. 
My goal in this article is to explore two issues. The first is a problem in 
legal and social history: how did late medieval Londoners use the legal and 
archival powers of governing authorities in order to negotiate their lives? The 
second is a problem in historical methodology: how can thinking about the 
archives as historical agents rather than as inert repositories of evidence refine 
the way we use historical documents? Over the last several years, while 
working on the legal history of late medieval London, I have become 
interested in considering medieval legal history from the vantage point of the 
„archival turn‟, an approach to working with archival sources influenced 
especially by Arlette Farge‟s Goût de l’archive and Jacques Derrida‟s Archive 
Fever.3  Briefly stated, taking the archival turn demands that historians be 
more self-conscious not only about the meaning of the documents they study, 
but also about how the documents came to be archived in the first place, in 
whose interest they have been officially preserved, and how the documenting 
                                           
2 Jules Michelet, Histoire de la Révolution française, ed. Gérard Walter, Paris 1952, vol. 1, p. 14, cited 
in Carolyn Steedman, Dust, Manchester, 2001, p. 27.  
3 Arlette Farge, Le goût de l’archive, Paris, 1989; Jacques Derrida, Mal d’archive: une impression 
freudienne, Paris, 1995, in English translation as Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, translated by 
Eric Prenowitz, Chicago, 1996, esp. p. 4n on politics and the archive. Historians have, in using 
Derrida, often deliberately taken the „archive‟ more literally than did Derrida himself. See 
Steedman, Dust (esp. pp. 1-12 on the literalness of the archive), and a recent essay collection which 
acts also as a guide to the literature: Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History, ed. 
Antoinette Burton, Durham, NC, 2005. See also Harriet Bradley, „The Seductions of the Archive: 
Voices Lost and Found‟, History of the Human Sciences 12:2, 1999, pp. 107-22; Ann Laura Stoler, 
Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, Berkeley, 2002, pp. 162-
204; Jo Tollebeek, „‟Turn‟d to Dust and Tears‟: Revisiting the Archive‟, History and Theory 43, May 
2004, pp. 237-48. My title pays homage to a foundational work in considering the narrative 
qualities of many legal documents: Natalie Zemon Davis‟s Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and 
Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France, Stanford, 1987. 
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of particular events and processes – and not others – serves to shape what is 
known about the past. Although scholarship in several fields of historical 
study, especially imperial and colonial history, has embraced the archival turn, 
as yet few pre-modernists have responded to it.4  Nonetheless those of us who 
use archives compiled before the rise of the modern state (the entity generally 
seen as responsible for the constitution of modern archives) can both benefit 
from the insights of this literature and offer useful critiques to the modernist 
assumptions embedded in this (post)modernist scholarship. 
It is particularly useful to juxtapose the methods of the archival turn 
with an approach to legal history that Peter Coss has termed „law in society‟.5 
Rather than focusing on the power of the state apparatus (the traditional 
emphasis of legal history), „law in society‟ literature has underscored how law 
works through social interactions, with individuals effectively using the power 
of governing authorities and their laws to negotiate their lives. As E. P. 
Thompson famously asserted, law was at „every bloody level‟ of social relations, 
deeply imbricated in their workings.6 The law and its archives were not 
infinitely malleable, of course; while those involved in legal processes wielded 
the law and the archive (understood broadly as any recording authority, be it 
royal, civic, or ecclesiastical), at the same time they had to operate within the 
framework the law established. If people used the law and the archive for their 
own purposes, in turn the law and the archive shaped or constrained people‟s 
choices and relationships.  
A legal history lens is particularly suited to examining premodern 
archives, as most premodern archival documents are records of legal 
proceedings and transactions. Those documents cannot be seen only as 
reflections of the past, as witnesses to history, but must also be understood as 
agents in the historical process. Legal documents were not just inert and 
                                           
4 A notable exception is the special issue, entitled „Fabrique des archives, fabrique de l'histoire‟, of 
Revue de synthèse 125, 2004. 
5 See, for premodern English legal history, Peter Coss, ed., The Moral World of the Law, Cambridge, 
2000; Christopher Brooks and Michael Lobban (eds), Communities and Courts in Britain, 1150-1900, 
London, 1997; Anthony Musson, Medieval Law in Context: The Growth of Legal Consciousness from 
Magna Carta to the Peasants’ Revolt, Manchester, 2001; Anthony Musson, ed., Expectations of the Law 
in the Middle Ages, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2001. For premodern Europe more generally, see Daniel 
Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423, 
Ithaca, 2003; Michael Goodich (ed), Voices from the Bench: The Narratives of Lesser Folk in Medieval 
Trials, Houndmills, 2006. 
6 E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays, London, 1978, p. 288 (emphasis original). 
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transparent accounts of a legal proceeding or act. These documents were 
written precisely because they were meant to do something, to be, at least 
potentially, performative, or because they might later be called upon, either by 
the recording authorities or by the parties involved, to demonstrate that 
particular people did something in a particular way at a particular time and 
place. Accordingly the way documents were recorded was subject to the 
various interests of the parties involved and the recording authorities.7 At the 
same time, legal archives also include documents that recorded what someone 
thought should happen, hoped would happen, wanted to pretend had 
happened – and yet sometimes had not happened at all, or at least not as 
recorded in the document. In being archived, however, those aspirational 
documents in a sense become what happened.  
In this article I will tease out these issues through a microhistorical 
examination of a late medieval English marriage case involving two 
Londoners named Joan Stokton Turnaunt and Richard Turnaunt. In doing 
so, I hope to shed light not only on what documents meant and mean, but 
also on law and legal processes, the point of connection between many of 
those documents and the world in which they were recorded and used. In the 
circumstances surrounding the Turnaunt case, someone manipulated the 
processes of law, using the authority and perceived truthfulness of  the legal 
record – the power of the archive – to perpetrate a falsity. Documents (and 
the inferences we can draw from them) concerning the life stories of Joan 
Stokton and Richard Turnaunt invites us to broaden this analysis even 
further, to consider how legal and archival mechanisms intersected not only 
with rational strategies of social negotiation, but also with the irrational and 




In 1469, the records of the Consistory court of the diocese of London 
indicate that Joan Stokton alias Turnaunt sued for divorce a vinculo (or what 
                                           
7 The classic account of the development of the documentary record, and the ways in which 
documents were used and understood a century or more before the period under consideration 
here, is Michael Clanchy‟s From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307, 2nd ed., Oxford, 
1993. Smail, in Consumption of Justice, esp. pp. 207-41, uses a different approach to discuss the 
development of the medieval archive in a legal culture quite distinct from England‟s. 
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we would call an annulment) from her husband Richard Turnaunt.8  The 
basis for the annulment was a previous marriage she had contracted with 
another man, John Colyn, in about 1445, twenty-four years before. This 
previous union made her 1458 marriage with Richard Turnaunt bigamous 
and therefore null. The testimony recorded in the case was straightforward 
and the annulment was probably granted.9 As we will see, however, 
inconsistencies and anomalies in the evidence raise doubts about what the 
documents in this case actually tell us. 
Joan Stokton came from and married into wealthy and prominent 
families, and she and her family members have left a number of traces in 
other fifteenth-century legal and government records. Together with the 
marriage case, these records allow us to weave together something of a 
reconstruction of her life. Joan was the daughter of John Stokton, a 
prominent mercer, alderman, and (in the year following his daughter‟s 
divorce) Lord Mayor of London. When he died in 1473 he left a significant 
fortune and was likely one of the wealthiest men in London.10 In the 1440s, 
when our story begins, John Stokton was already active as an international 
merchant,11 and Joan was probably his eldest child. In the colourfully detailed 
story told in 1469 by the witnesses to her divorce suit, Joan Stokton and John 
Colyn had exchanged vows of present consent (that is, binding vows of 
                                           
8 London Metropolitan Archives, MS DL/C/205, Consistory Court of the Diocese of London 
Deposition Book 1467-76 [hereafter LMA, MS DL/C/205], fols. 45v-47v. 
9 The court‟s judgement and sentence do not survive. I have inferred that the annulment was 
granted based on the straightforward(-seeming) evidence, the lack of contestation of the suit, and 
Joan‟s father‟s 1471 will which implies that Joan is no longer married to Richard (see below, n. 33). 
10 See Sylvia L. Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieval London, 1300-1500  Ann Arbor, 1962, p. 
368. The date of his death is fixed by a writ of diem clausit extremum (triggering an inquisition post 
mortem) issued on death of John Stokton, knight, of Bucks., Essex, and Herts., 10 May 1473. 
Calendar of the Fine Rolls… 1471-85, London, 1961, p. 59. Although he left a very considerable estate 
on his death (about £8300), his widow Elizabeth Stokton and her subsequent husband Gerard 
Canizian could not administer the provisions of his will, and a good deal of chancery litigation 
resulted. See Kew, The National Archives [hereafter TNA], C 1/82/59, C 1/64/595, C 1/59/69, 
C 1/108/106, C 1/234/8, C 4/21/104; Will of John Stokton, 1473, PCC Prob. 11/6, fols. 71v-
75r; Laetitia Lyell and Frank D. Watney, Acts of the Court of the Mercers’ Company, 1453-1527, 
Cambridge, 1936, pp. 77, 81, 99-100; Anne F. Sutton, The Mercery of London: Trade, Goods, and 
People, 1130-1578, Aldershot, 2005, p. 226. 
11 Reginald R. Sharpe, ed., Calendar of Letter-Books Preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of the 
City of London at the Guildhall, 11 vols., Letter Books G through L, London, 1899-1912, Letter Book K, 
p. 217; Calendar of the Patent Rolls… 1446-52, London, 1909, pp. 140, 186. 
 6 
marriage) twenty-four years before.12  On the Sunday before the feast of St. 
Bartholomew, late August 1445, the two witnesses were on their way to watch 
wrestling in Clerkenwell, on the outskirts of the city of London. Crossing St. 
Lawrence‟s Lane in the Jewry, they ran into John Colyn, standing in the lane 
at the doorway of John Stokton‟s house. John Colyn asked the two men to 
come up with him to the gallery of John Stokton‟s house to hear what would 
be said between him and Joan Stokton, John Stokton‟s daughter, who was 
then sitting on the highest step of the stairway leading to the gallery. There in 
the gallery the two men bore witness while John Colyn and Joan Stokton 
exchanged vows of present consent to marry and gave one another gifts. What 
happened after this exchange of consent is not recorded, but both witnesses 
testified that John Colyn was still alive, that he was living in Cambridge, and 
that they had each seen him at different times within the previous year. As the 
contract of marriage John and Joan had allegedly made was binding, they had 
all this time been married. 
Joan, John Stokton‟s oldest surviving child at the time of his death, was 
likely very young in 1445; I suspect she was in her mid-teens, just as the two 
witnesses and possibly also John Colyn were. For the daughter of an up-and-
coming mercer to make a contract of marriage with a man in the presence of 
only two adolescents, and in the absence of her father or any other guardian, 
would have been well outside the normal channels for the merchant elite of 
London in the fifteenth century. While marriages for daughters of the civic 
elite were usually not entirely arranged, as they often were for the aristocracy, 
                                           
12 By late medieval Catholic theology and canon law, the sacramental tie of marriage was created by 
the exchange of consent between the man and the woman, in England normally through formulaic 
words („I take thee, Joan, to be my wedded wife‟; „I take thee John to be my wedded husband‟). This 
could take place anywhere and any time, and no priest‟s presence or blessing was necessary. On the 
canon law of marriage in late medieval England, see Richard Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in 
Medieval England, Cambridge, 1974,  and Michael M. Sheehan, Marriage, Family, and Law in 
Medieval Europe: Collected Studies, ed. James K. Farge, Toronto, 1996. For marriage in London, see 
Shannon McSheffrey, Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture in Late Medieval London, Philadelphia, 2006. 
See also important work by Richard M. Wunderli, London Church Courts and Society on the Eve of the 
Reformation, Cambridge, Mass, 1981; Charles Donahue, Jr., „The Canon Law on the Formation of 
Marriage and Social Practice in the Later Middle Ages‟, Journal of Family History 8, 1983, pp. 144-58; 
L. R. Poos, „The Heavy-Handed Marriage Counsellor: Regulating Marriage in Some Later-Medieval 
English Local Ecclesiastical-Court Jurisdictions‟, American Journal of Legal History 39, 1995, 291-309; P. 
J. P. Goldberg, Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy: Women in York and Yorkshire, c. 
1300-1520, Oxford, 1992; Frederik Pedersen, Marriage Disputes in Medieval England London, 2000. 
For Europe more generally, see James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, 
Chicago, 1987. 
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marriage choices were nonetheless closely supervised and directed.13 I have 
not been able to trace John Colyn (a number of men had that name in 
London during the period in question, but none appears to fit), which itself 
suggests that he was not of a family and background that befitted a marriage 
to the daughter of John Stokton. The witnesses did not testify regarding what 
happened following the exchange of consent, but imply that the marriage was 
abandoned and that Joan Stokton and John Colyn went on to live separate 
lives.  
Fourteen years later, in 1458, then likely about thirty years old and 
apparently not having married again in the meantime, Joan Stokton married 
Richard Turnaunt, a candidate much better suited to her status as the 
daughter of a prominent mercer. Richard, also aged about thirty in 1458,14 
was the son of a Winchester landowner. After his father‟s death in 1432, 
Richard‟s mother Joan married twice more, in both cases to prominent 
London merchants. As his second stepfather John Gedney had no children of 
his own, Richard Turnaunt ultimately became the heir, after his mother‟s 
death in 1462, to Gedney‟s manors in Tottenham,15 and it was as a Middlesex 
gentleman that Richard Turnaunt lived most of his adult life. Richard had 
been married previously, to a woman named Elizabeth who died in 1457,16 
although there were apparently no surviving children from that union. When 
Richard Turnaunt and Joan Stokton married in October 1458, the 
Tottenham manors were settled on the couple and the heirs of Richard‟s 
body, with John Stokton acting as one of the feoffees (trustees) of the 
manors.17 About 1459 or 1460, Joan gave birth to a daughter, Thomasine,18 
                                           
13 See McSheffrey, Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture, ch. 1 and 3. 
14 Daniel Lysons, The Environs of London: Being an Historical Account of the Towns, Villages and 
Hamlets, Within Twelve Miles of that Capital, 4 vols., London, 1792-1796, vol. 3, p. 526. 
15 Will of Joan Gedney, 1462, London, Guildhall Library [hereafter GL], MS 9171/5, fols. 327v-
328r. 
16 John Weever noted her funeral monument in Tottenham parish church, which read „Orate … 
Elizabeth Turnant uxoris Richardi Turnant Ar<miger>, que obit …. 1457‟. John Weever, Ancient 
Funerall Monuments, London, 1631, p. 535. 
17 Letter patent issued 14 Oct. 1458; according to the witness in the Consistory Court divorce case, 
the two married a week later, 21 Oct. 1458. Calendar of the Patent Rolls…1452-61, London, 1910, pp. 
474-75; LMA, MS DL/C/205, fol. 45v. Feoffments to use – the conveyance of lands to a group of 
trustees or feoffees who were honour-bound to hold them for the benefit of the feoffor – were 
commonly employed in the England in the late Middle Ages to circumvent legal restrictions on the 
conveyance of land. 
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and apparently there were other children born in the first years of the 
marriage who died in infancy.19 
A document suggests that by the mid 1460s – if not before20 – there 
were serious problems with Richard‟s and Joan‟s marriage. About 1464, 
Richard Turnaunt sued his father-in-law John Stokton in Chancery, 
complaining that although he, Richard, „many times and oft hath required 
the said John Stokton to release all his right and claim that he hath had, hath, 
or in time to come may have‟ as feoffee, John Stokton has nonetheless 
steadfastly refused to do so. Richard gives no reason for demanding that John 
Stokton relinquish his feoffeeship, except to say that „good faith and 
conscience‟ require it.21 Whether as a result of the Chancery suit or other 
circumstances, Stokton did relinquish his claims as feoffee on the manors in 
March 1464.22 The licence confirming the new list of feoffees – same as the 
old list but without John Stokton – still listed Joan, daughter of John Stokton, 
as Richard Turnaunt‟s wife.23 In other words, officially the marriage was still 
extant, and Joan, if widowed, would have had a life interest in the property. 
Nonetheless, by 1464 hostility between Richard Turnaunt and his wife‟s 
family – perhaps also his wife – appears to have become serious. This 
inference is obviously given much more credibility by our knowledge that an 
uncontested suit for divorce was launched in 1469. 
Superficially, Turnaunt c. Turnaunt was an uncomplicated bigamy case: 
Joan was already married when she solemnized her union with Richard 
                                                                                                                             
18 Richard Turnaunt‟s inquisition post mortem states that she was 26 years old in 1486. Calendar of 
Inquisitions Post Mortem . . . Henry VII, 3 vols., London, 1898-1955, vol. 1, pp. 80-81. 
19 GL, MS 9171/5, fol. 328r.  
20 In 1462, when Richard‟s dying mother, Joan Gedney, wrote her will, not only did she omit any 
mention of her daughter-in-law (which in itself would not have been unusual), but she also decreed 
that a particular piece of property should go, in the case of the deaths of Richard and Thomasine, 
his two-year-old daughter, to any other child Richard might have „per aliquam mulierem legitime et 
in sponsalia … procreandis [born to any woman legitimately and within marriage]‟.  This is an odd 
thing to say about a man who is already married to a woman of childbearing years and would 
normally have had every expectation of having more children with her. The will was dated 28 June 
1462 and probated 10 July 1462,  less than two weeks later. GL, MS 9171/5, fols. 327v-328r. 
21 TNA, C 1/28/50, 1462-64 (early date given by Joan Gedney‟s death, and likely early 1464, by 
evidence of Calendar of the Close Rolls…1461-68, London, 1940, p. 241). 
22 Calendar of the Close Rolls…1461-68, p. 241. 
23 The licence was dated 20 Mar. 1464; Calendar of the Patent Rolls… 1461-67, London, 1897, pp. 
325-26. 
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Turnaunt, and sufficient witnesses were brought forward to testify to this. The 
witnesses delivered clear and precise testimony. No counter-evidence was 
introduced by Richard Turnaunt, who apparently did not oppose the case. 
The consistory court judge dissolved the marriage, apparently satisfied with 
the evidence. 
But perhaps he should not have been: despite what seems a clear-cut 
case, a number of prickling anomalies in the depositions present themselves. 
The first is the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that the witnesses who 
claimed to have seen and heard Joan Stokton‟s first marriage to John Colyn 
were lying, and that indeed the first marriage, the basis of the divorce suit, was 
entirely invented. This spectre is raised by a spate of similar bigamy cases that 
were heard before the Consistory court between the time of the Turnaunt 
divorce in 1469 and 1474. In these suits, a suspiciously convenient long-ago 
contract, often to a person either subsequently deceased or whose 
whereabouts were unknown at the time of the suit, surfaced to be used as 
grounds to annul a later marriage.24 While some of these cases may have been 
genuine, of course, the clustering of this sort of suit in a five-year period 
suggests instead the discovery, and subsequent abandonment, of a convenient 
means of ending an inconvenient marriage.  
In some of these bigamy cases between 1469 and 1474 the evidence for 
perjury is more direct. In 1471, for instance, Maude Radclyffe, a sixty-year-old 
widow, told the Consistory court that she was asked to testify falsely that she 
had been present twenty-two years before at a contract of marriage, on the 
strength of written „proof‟ that the contract had taken place: she was shown a 
document, on which was written, in English, „“I, Thomas Weston, take you, 
Cecily, as my wife and thereto I give you my faith”, and then Cecily said to 
him, “And I, Cecily, take you, Thomas, as my husband, and thereto I give you 
my faith”‟. She said that the document also recorded that the said contract 
was celebrated on the Friday immediately after the middle Sunday of Lent, 
twenty-two years before. Maude, however, was less inclined to accept this 
documentary proof than those who attempted to induce her to perjury hoped, 
and instead she simply reported the subornation.25 In another of these cases, a 
                                           
24 See the cases listed below in n.29. 
25 „Interrogata ulterius utrum nouit vel sciuit de aliquo contractu matrimoniali habito siue facto 
inter Ceciliam et Thomam Weston, dicit quod non interfuit in aliquo contractu habito inter dictos 
Ceciliam et Thomam Weston, nisi sub modo sequenti, videlicet quod una cedula erat coram ista 
iurata porrecta, in anglicis concepta, et per eandem perlecta, sub hiis verbis, “Ego Thomas Weston 
capio te Ceciliam in uxorem meam et ad hoc do tibi fidem meam”, et tunc dicta Cecilia dixit 
 10 
witness later returned to the court to rescind his previous testimony, 
admitting instead that a man named Thomas Gryffyn had promised him forty 
shillings to testify that he had been present at the long-ago contract of 
marriage, when in fact he had not been.26 It surely cannot be coincidental that 
the same Thomas Gryffyn was one of the witnesses in Turnaunt c. Turnaunt27; 
this later accusation against him certainly casts significant doubt on his 
testimony about witnessing an exchange of consent between Joan Stokton and 
John Colyn in the gallery of her father‟s house in 1445. After 1474, bigamy 
cases based on long-ago-but-just-recently-remembered prior contracts disappear 
from the surviving records of London Consistory court litigation, suggesting 
that what had been a useful if mendacious legal strategem for ending an 
unwanted marriage was no longer successful at the Consistory court, possibly 
because judges were no longer willing to buy these stories.28 In 1469, however, 
it could have worked, and in Turnaunt c. Turnaunt, I think it did. 
But doubt about the veracity of the witnesses‟ account of the long-ago 
contract is not the only anomaly in the presentation of this divorce suit. Most 
often in cases of bigamy the plaintiff was the second spouse seeking to cast off 
the bigamous wife or husband.29 In this case, however, the suit was brought in 
                                                                                                                             
eidem, “Et ego Cecilia accipio te Thomam in maritum meum et ad hoc do tibi fidem meam”. Et 
ulterius dicit quod erat scriptum in hac cedula quod dictus contractus erat celebratus in die veneris 
immediate precedente mediam dominicam quadragesime ultima preterita ad xxii annos elapso, et 
quod erat rogata ad deponendum quod erat presens illo die et huiusmodi contractum audiuit‟. 
LMA, MS DL/C/205, fol. 100r. 
26 LMA, MS DL/C/205, fol. 181v. 
27 LMA, MS DL/C/205, fol. 47v. He may also be the same Thomas Gryffyn who had sued Isabel 
Ady alias Tomson in 1467 to enforce a contract of marriage. Ibid., fols. 8rv. 
28 Possibly the practice of introducing a fabricated first marriage in a bigamy suit was for a brief 
time a commonly-accepted legal fiction, similar to the common recovery (with the use of the 
„common vouchee‟) developed around this time to bar entails (see Joseph Biancalana, The Fee Tail 
and the Common Recovery in Medieval England, 1176-1502, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 250-261, 284-90), or 
indeed to the practice of using professional co-respondents to produce evidence of adultery in 
twentieth-century divorce litigation in England and some American states (see Dorothy Dunbar 
Bromley, „Perjury Rears its Head in Our Courts: the Giving of False Testimony Becomes a Grave 
Problem For Those Whose Task It Is to Administer Justice‟, New York Times, 10 Jun. 1934, pp. 
SM7, SM17; and for a fictional account, Evelyn Waugh‟s A Handful of Dust, London, 1934, ch. 4).  
If for a brief time the Bishop‟s Official who presided over the Consistory court did wink at these 
bigamy cases, it was only a short-lived legal fiction, as they did not become standard legal practice. 
My thanks to Kenneth Salzberg for pointing out these legal fictions to me. 
29 In the following cases in LMA, MS DL/C/205 where a substantial period of time (over five years, 
and often as much as twenty years) had elapsed between the time of the allegedly first marriage and 
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the name of the bigamist herself, Joan, so that formally at least it was she who 
sought the dissolution of her second marriage. John Colyn, her allegedly 
legitimate husband, was neither a party to the suit nor apparently involved in 
any way. By canon law, Joan should have been restored to John Colyn as his 
wife, and indeed any marriage that he had made subsequent to his marriage 
to Joan was also to be dissolved. In a formal sense, that may indeed be what 
happened (we do not have the actual sentence), but in the depositions, John 
Colyn functioned as a third party, living in far-enough-away Cambridge, 
uninvolved in the case and long since departed from Joan‟s life. This may be, 
of course, because John Colyn was entirely invented. But that does not solve a 
more pressing problem: why would Joan Stokton Turnaunt have revealed or 
even invented such a serious sin, the abrogation of a sacrament, in order to 
obtain a divorce? 
If we consider the divorce suit in light of the classic detective‟s 
question, cui bono, our eyes turn not towards Joan, but towards Richard. 
Richard Turnaunt, a man about forty in 1469 and without a male heir, 
apparently lost little, if anything, in material terms from the divorce. 
Subsequent records emanating from the Turnaunt family, such as wills, 
unsurprisingly omitted any mention of Joan, although the extent of her 
erasure from the family record is surprising: by 1488 Richard‟s long-dead first 
wife, Elizabeth, rather than Joan, was being named as Thomasine‟s mother.30 
                                                                                                                             
the case, the plaintiff was the second spouse: Margaret Spyndeler c. William Hathewey (1467), fols. 9rv; 
Margery Walkelyn c. William Chapman (1468), 19r-20r, 24v, 27v-29r, 30r; William Langton c. Isabel 
Hamond (1468-69), 23rv, 49v-50v; Robert Eustas c. Puttance Eustas alias Reve (1470), 69v-71v; Alice 
Couper c. Henry Stowe (1471), 104r-105v; Thomas Baldynge c. Agnes Saunder alias Baldyng (1471), 116v-
118r, 118v; Thomas Conyngham c. Joan Fordell (1472), 140v-142r. The exceptions, where the bigamist 
sues, often had unusual circumstances, e.g. Andrew Kynge c. Alice Mylle, 77v-78r, 83rv (1470), which 
may have arisen from a complaint made to the commissary earlier in 1470 – GL 9064/1, fols. 37r – 
that Andrew Kyng had two wives, both living, a complaint that may have forced him to seek the 
divorce; or Cecily Swanton c. William Bechynge (1473), fols. 193r-194r, in which the previous spouse 
conveniently remembered by Cecily Swanton was now dead, although living at the time of the 
subsequent contract. See also for bigamists as plaintiffs: Richard Buntynge c. Joan Hyldryard (1472), 
178v-180v, 181v (see above, n. 26 regarding perjury in this case); John Ballard c. Joan Sharpe alias 
Ballard (1473),182v-183v, 189v-190r. In cases where the first spouse sued for restitution of the 
marriage, the contracts were usually made in close proximity to each other and to the launch of the 
suit. 
30 Will of Richard Turnaunt, 1486, TNA, PCC, Prob. 11/7, fols. 193rv; Calendar of the Patent Rolls 
… 1485-94, London, 1914, pp. 228-29. As Thomasine was apparently born about 1460 (see above 
n. 18), she could not have been the daughter of Elizabeth, who died in 1457. In the will of Sir John 
Risley (Thomasine‟s husband), TNA, PCC, Prob. 11/17, fols. 60v-61r, even Elizabeth is forgotten 
in favour of Turnaunt‟s third wife, Margaret. 
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The divorce seems to have allowed Richard to start his life over again, and he 
married at least once more before his death in 1486.31 Although he never had 
the male heir he presumably wanted, his daughter Thomasine‟s marriage to 
Sir John Risley, a courtier of Edward IV and later a knight of the Body to 
Henry VII, brought his daughter into court circles.32 For Joan, on the other 
hand, the advantages of a divorce that would have been both economically 
punitive and socially humiliating are harder to see. She would not have been 
able to remarry, as the sentence would have declared her still married to John 
Colyn, whom the witnesses declared to be still living, as far as they knew. 
There is no sign in the case or in other evidence that Joan wanted to, or did, 
take up with Colyn, if indeed he existed. In my initial reading of the case, I 
could only hypothesize that Joan was willing to make these considerable 
sacrifices to escape her marriage to Richard because he was abusive or 
otherwise unbearable. I changed my mind, however, when I began to look at 
evidence outside the testimony given in the Consistory court. These other 
records suggest another possible explanation: that Joan Stokton Turnaunt had 
nothing to do with the case, even though on paper she was the plaintiff. 
We know from many subsequent records more or less what happened 
to Richard, as I have already related; but we have only one poignant piece of 
evidence about what happened to Joan. In 1471, two years after the divorce, 
when John Stokton wrote a long and detailed will, he did not mention his 
daughter Joan until the very end, in the last sentence. The last several 
bequests, including the one to Joan, were written in English while the rest of 
the long will was composed in Latin, suggesting the last bequests were 
afterthoughts, possibly added at a later date than the composition of the rest 
of the will (he died in 1473). The last sentence reads: „To Joan, my daughter, 
if that she be alive at the hour of my decease, [and if] that it may be 
understood that she be married or if she have bestowed herself to live in any 
devout place to serve God, there to lead her life in cleanness, £100‟.33 The 
phraseology of this bequest implies that her father himself did not know if she 
was married or unmarried, in a nunnery or leading her life in „uncleanness,‟ 
                                           
31 At his death he was married to Margaret, formerly the wife of John Pye, although it is not clear 
when they married. TNA, PCC, Prob. 11/7, fol. 193rv. 
32 On Risley see Roger Virgoe, „Sir John Risley (1443-1512), Courtier and Councillor‟, Norfolk 
Archaeology 38, 1982, pp. 140-48. Thomasine had had a brief prior marriage to Richard Charlton, 
another gentleman, but that marriage had been annuled: TNA, C 1/66/286. 
33 TNA, PCC, Prob. 11/6, fols. 71v-75r (quotation at 75r).  
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that is, as a prostitute or bawd. In short, he apparently did not know what she 
was doing, or presumably where she was (nunnery or brothel), at the time he 
composed this bequest.  
Joan had evidently lost contact with her birth family by the early 1470s, 
perhaps following her 1469 divorce which made her marital and social status 
so ambiguous. As her father‟s bequest indicates, in a social sense her two 
choices following the divorce would have been to resume marriage with her 
„real‟ husband, John Colyn, or enter a nunnery; marrying another man would 
have been impossible without evidence for the death of John Colyn, and for 
her father, at least, apparently living life as a single woman would put her 
beyond the pale. It is possible, however, that her disappearance had taken 
place long before that, before the divorce, perhaps even as far back as the early 
1460s. This might explain why her mother-in-law wrote her will in 1462 in a 
way that suggested that Richard Turnaunt‟s marital situation was uncertain, 
and why Turnaunt told the Chancellor in 1464 that „good faith and 
conscience‟ demanded that John Stokton remove himself from his position as 
feoffee to the couple‟s lands. Above all, Joan‟s abandonment of her marital 
and natal families could explain why a marriage suit that worked so much to 
Joan‟s disadvantage was brought in her name in 1469: maybe she did not 
bring the suit at all. Suits brought in the name of one person but without 
their knowledge were far from unknown in fifteenth-century England: the 
Chancellor heard a number of cases in which women contended that 
litigation had been undertaken in their names but without their knowledge, 
consent, or participation.34 Given the frequent legal representation of women 
by proxies, it would not have been difficult to do this. The form that Turnaunt 
c. Turnaunt took – the neat, detailed, and certain testimony of the witnesses 
(which included exact dates) and the lack of any counter-evidence – suggests 
that the suit was being undertaken in such a way that the evidence would be 
clear and unassailable, a textbook case. If Richard wanted – or, from his point 
of view, needed – a way of declaring his marriage to Joan to be definitively 
ended so that he could remarry, a suit fraudulently undertaken in Joan‟s 
name but really at Richard‟s instigation would have been the neatest way to 
accomplish it. A bigamy suit could have been, more logically should have 
been, brought by Richard, requesting a divorce from Joan on the grounds of 
her precontract, but this would have been difficult if she had already 
disappeared. While a marriage case could proceed even when the defendant 
                                           
34 E.g. TNA, C1/66/308, C1/66/353. 
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did not respond to a citation or summons to appear in the church court,35 
Joan‟s lack of response to the citation might have raised issues Richard 
preferred to leave dormant. Strategically, then, it would have been in 
Richard‟s interest instead to engineer a suit brought in her name, rather than 
his; if he had sued her, it would have been more obvious that she was not 
present to answer the suit. There is no record that either Joan or Richard ever 
appeared in the Consistory court; in Consistory court litigation parties were 
usually represented by proctors, and it was possible, although probably 
uncommon, for the parties not to appear before the court at all.36 If Joan‟s 
relatives were ignorant of the suit, or simply let it go out of embarrassment or 
anger with her, this strategem could have, and perhaps did, work.  
What happened to Joan Stokton we will almost certainly never know. 
The scenario I presented above of Joan‟s disappearance and Richard‟s 
construction of a false suit is hypothetical, and almost certainly unprovable – 
but I believe it is the most plausible of the various scenarios I can construct 
from the evidence I have uncovered about the case and those involved in it. It 
is certainly more plausible than the story reconstructible from the documents 




My experience chasing down the records that related to Joan Stokton, 
Richard Turnaunt, and those connected to them have resembled in all-too-
uncanny ways the fictional processes of detection: I went down many wrong 
paths, spent far too much time chasing down the wrong people, and 
experienced several exciting epiphanic moments when I dug up a crucial 
connection. I conceptualized the „facts‟ of the case in many different ways 
before arriving at the scenario that I have unveiled here, in Hercule Poirot 
fashion. Were I addressing a drawing room that included the guilty parties, I 
might be able to startle a confession from Richard Turnaunt by the brilliance 
of my deductions. But I am neither a golden-age detective, nor a golden-age 
historian. 
As historians, we pride ourselves on our empiricism: we derive our 
arguments from archival, textual, and material evidence. The epistemic 
problem for a discipline that relies on what can be documented, however, is 
                                           
35 Helmholz, Marriage Litigation, p. 124. 
36 Ibid. 
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that what is documentable is sometimes false, and indeed deliberately written 
so as to deceive. While obviously none of the records used here were written 
with the 21st-century historian in mind, they were written with the archive in 
mind. To use a fifteenth-century word, they were memoranda, things which are 
to be remembered (and by extension, things which are to displace other things 
which are to be forgotten). As Derrida suggests, the Archive induces amnesia 
as well as remembering.37 In one sense, the written record then becomes what 
happened; as Carolyn Steedman says, the archive is in the future perfect tense 
– what is written is what will have been.38 When in 1488, Sir John and 
Thomasina Risley named Richard and Elizabeth Turnaunt as Thomasina‟s 
parents,39 they sought to efface Joan Stokton Turnaunt‟s existence from the 
record, and, in this one document at least, Joan‟s maternity disappeared. A 
record‟s „factual‟ status, its ability to become what-will-have-been, may also 
have to suffer competition from other versions – other documents that 
suggest the impossibility of Elizabeth‟s maternity, for instance – creating 
fissures and disjunctures into which later historians can burrow. Each new 
document, discovered partly through diligence but also partly through luck, 
casts each of the previous bits of evidence in a new light, in effect changing 
their meanings. For this reason, the meaning can only ever be unstable and 
temporary40: while possibly no further clues about Joan Stokton will be 
uncovered by me or by anyone else, something else could surface and throw 
the meaning I have here established out the window.41  
Thinking about how the documents were recorded and archived not 
only destabilizes their meanings, but it also suggests a way to come out the 
other side of the epistemological dilemma about what the historical evidence 
can tell us. Late medieval English people used documents, as well as the legal 
processes in which those documents were employed and produced, in 
                                           
37 Steedman, Dust, pp. 4-5; Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 11. 
38 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 9; Steedman, Dust, p. 7.  
39 CPR, 1485-94, pp. 228-29. 
40 Farge‟s formulation of how to write this instability is thoughtful: Farge, Goût de l’archive, pp. 145-
48. 
41 As I was finishing final revisions for this article, I came across a 1470 reference to a Joan Stokton, 
nun in the Dominican nunnery at Dartford (John Dunkin, The History and Anquities of Dartford, 
London, 1844, pp. 126-27), and I thought perhaps I had, belatedly, found the answer to Joan‟s last 
days. This Joan Stokton, however, is the daughter of Thomas Stoughton, fishmonger of London 
(ibid.; Will of Thomas Stoughton, 1478, TNA, PCC Prob. 11/7, fols. 23r-23v). 
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complex and sophisticated ways. Law was not only a framework through 
which the church, crown, and city could police, authenticate, and supervise 
personal relationships such as marriage, but it was also a tool that could be 
wielded by skilful practitioners, professional and lay, to achieve their own 
ends. The law was sometimes flexible, vulnerable to influence. This flexibility 
made it integral to the complex workings of late medieval English social and 
political processes. Richard Turnaunt may have been able to manipulate the 
divorce case, against legal right, simply because he had greater political, social, 
and legal influence.42 Thus if the archived documents that accompanied the 
workings of the law are a less straightforward empirical basis for our 
knowledge of the past than historians have sometimes assumed, those 
documents, viewed from a slightly different angle, provide remarkable 
evidence precisely for those legal, political, and archival processes. 
Yet crucially important aspects of the past remain occluded, and it is 
hard to see how they can be reached through empirical methods. It is 
comparatively easy to hypothesize about how medieval documents functioned 
when they were wielded in rational ways that maximized the economic, 
political, or social self-interest of the wielders. What remains less easy to infer 
are actions motivated by unreason or emotion, or by a different kind of self-
interest that cannot be measured by economic or political advantage. My 
thinking about the Turnaunt case has privileged scholars‟ arguments about 
the greater legal and political savoir-faire manhood conferred as well as 
assumptions about Richard‟s self-interest – the aristocrat‟s need for a male 
heir, his desire (only to be expected in his circumstances) to rid himself of a 
wife who was barren and possibly even absent. Still remaining veiled, 
accessible only through speculation, are the reasons for the marriage‟s 
breakdown and Joan‟s disappearance: Joan may have descended into serious 
mental illness, or Richard may have been physically or mentally abusive, or 
they may simply have intensely disliked one another.  But perhaps I am wrong 
that Richard manipulated the case. If Joan did indeed voluntarily bring the 
                                           
42 This was not the way it always went: the principles of the law could sometimes prove 
unexpectedly obdurate. Some fifteenth-century men and women were able to use the remarkable 
powers that medieval canon law gave to individuals in the making of marriage to defeat those who 
otherwise held all the cards of power and influence. An obvious example of this is the failed 
attempt by the Paston family to annul the marriage of Margery Paston (sister of John II and John 
III)  to the family bailiff Richard Calle; all their best efforts to influence the bishop of Norwich‟s 
decision came to nought, as he could not deny the couple their canonical right to make a marriage. 
Norman Davis, ed., The Paston Letters and Papers of the Fifteenth Century, 2 vols., Oxford, 1971, 1976, 
vol. 1, pp. 341-44, 351, 408-10, 541-42. 
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suit herself, as the records state, she used litigation not to advance socially, 
politically, or economically, as did many other late medieval litigants, but in 
fact to fall quite precipitously out of a marriage with a gentleman, into a life 
cut off from her marital and natal families. It may have been worth it to her to 
be free of the marriage, for reasons that may, or may not, have been rational, 
even though divorcing Richard evidently meant losing both her daughter and 
her own birth family. Either way, Joan‟s case highlights one of the difficulties 
facing us as historians, for we often depend, sometimes unconsciously, upon 
our assumptions about rational strategies of social negotiation to make 
narrative connections between the scattered bits of evidence out of which we 
write our history. The end of Joan‟s life, as far as I know, is not documented, 
leaving us only with speculative imaginings. It is hard to imagine, however, 
that her days ended happily.   
 
